Commanding the 63e in 1870 was Louis Adolphe Zentz d'Allnois. Born at Cons-La-Grandville in 1820, the son of a captain in Napoleon's Garde Impériale, he graduated from St Cyr in 1840 as a sous-lieutenant in the 44e Régiment. He spent the next thirteen years on Africa, rising to the rank of captain. In 1853 he transferred to the 12e chasseurs à pied and instead of going the the Crimea went with then in 1854 to the Baltic as a part of the force sent to capture the fortress of Bomarsund from the Russians. Zentz was given the advanced guard and with three companies of the 12e Chasseurs successfully took up a firing position from which he was able to deliver such an accurate fire that made it impossible for the Russian gunners to serve their guns. Two days later the French artillery was able to reduce fortress and force it to surrender without the need to storm the place. For his actions he was made chef de batallion.
Promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 1858 he served with the 71e Régiment in Italy, fighting at Magenta and Solferino. After that campaign he transferred to the Garde, serving with the 2e Voltigeurs Régiment. In August 1861 he was made colonel of the 63e and led it through several North African campaigns.
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| Colonel Zentz |
He led the 63e in 1870 at Spicheren and took over command of the brigade after the death of Döens. Made général de brigade six days after the battle he was interned with the rest of the Army of the Rhine on the fall of Metz.
On return from internment Zentz was posted to Toulouse where he successfully repressed a newly established Commune. He then went on to bloodlessly disperse communards in three nearby cities.
Made général de division in 1873 he was given command of a cavalry brigade in the Army of Lyon. He took command of the 11th Army Corps in Nantes in 1880 and in 1884 was appointed president of the Infantry Advisory Committee. He lived to the ripe old age of 90, dying at Nantes in 1911.
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Between 1835 and 1870 it rotated between African and home service. It did not serve in the Crimea or Italy. It was heavily engaged at Spicheren in 1870, losing 15 officers and 315 men. While the line battalions were made prisoners of war in October, the depot battalion provided troops for the garrisons for the fortresses of Toul and Phalsbourg.
Two further periods of service in Algeria followed in the 1870s and 1880s. It was engaged in 32 distinct actions in the Great War and saw action in 1940 in the Battle of France and again in the liberation of 1944-45.
To me one of the interesting things about reading your histories is how much experience was available to the French in the Franco Prussian war, although fighting in North Africa was obviously a different proposition than going up against a highly trained Prussian army. Lovely work on the unit, and I especially like the dynamic pose of the officer and think I can recall that he has made an appearance elsewhere.
ReplyDeleteYes the officer appears in most of my battalions...there is only one officer in the plastic set.
DeleteYou are right there was a vast practical experience amongst the officer corps, but because they had been so successful in their pre-1870 conflicts they didn't see a need to change their drills despite the changes in technology. They had observed the Austrian War of 1866, but failed to recognise that it was the flexibility of the German battalion to divide and divide again as the tactical situation required to outmanoeuvre the clumsy Austrian battalion masses and simply decided that the needle gun was the decisive factor and all they needed to do was to build a better rifle.
I don't know that the Germans were significantly better trained, but they did possess better junior and non-commissioned officers and that enabled better control over those smaller units and this early adoption of small unit tactics allowed them to find and exploit gaps in the enemy line. At the same time the units were empowered to cooperate with other disconnected units outside the chain of command to achieve a common goal - mission tactics in reality.
The French corps commanders were largely talentless imperial favourites, but the officers from colonel to divisional command were on the whole competent. The junior officers on the other hand appear to have been more at home in the café than the parade ground - one less than flattering description was that they were better versed in the marital than the martial skills.
Another interesting potted history Mark and I like the red pants! Your point about the French being complacent because of constant success in their colonies is exactly the same issue the British had - they got the wake-up call in 1899 in S Africa and I believe by 1914 had a very well trained and competent regular army - it was just a bit too small to face off against 5 million Germans or whatever it was ... one might even say, a contemptible little army....!
ReplyDeleteYes the British certainly adopted a more professional approach after the Boer Wars, improving training and establishing a modern general staff, yet the high command in 1914 let them down.
DeleteThe unit histories and short bios of the commander certainly have put a good amount of detail to all the line regiments on parade. Then to be treated to the photos of the units in all the red pants glory makes for an enjoyable read.
ReplyDeleteThanks Joe. I am quite enjoying digging up the detail on the bios, some of which is in quite obscure places. I am down to the last seven battalions now.
DeleteMore fascinating history there Mark…
ReplyDeleteAnd the Pantalon rouge keep coming and coming.
All the best. Alt
Thanks Aly...I'm down to my last bolt of red fabric now!
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