The First of the French Cavalry for 1870

Mention French military involvement in North Africa and the mind immediately conjures up images of  rolling sand dunes,  charging Bedouin, sweating, sun burnt soldiers of the Foreign Legion, desperate actions against tall odds and the adventures of Beau Geste...pretty much like this...

...but the French experience in North Africa in the four decades prior to the Franco-Prussian War created a depth of combat experience amongst the various French regiments and leaders second to no other army in the world at that time. Nearly every French officer of colonel's rank or higher did his apprenticeship there and many regiments were rotated through African service. Yet the African experience had a profoundly adverse effect on operations in 1870.

Early experience in Africa taught the French that when on campaign closing up at night was crucial. Not only because these less populated regions meant that supplies, particularly water, were hard to come by, but small forces camping in open terrain were extremely vulnerable to the guerrilla tactics of the native forces. So on campaign the rear of the march column always closed up on the head at nightfall. This was all well and good with the small commands in Africa, but with the larger forces involved in the European campaigns it caused problems in that much time was lost at the beginning of each day's march breaking down the camp and forming the column.

The issues were evident in the Crimea and Italy, but ultimate success in those campaigns meant that the cracks were conveniently papered over and the Napoleonic system of improvisation (systeme D – “on se debrouillera toujours” or "one always muddles through somehow”) was deeply engrained in the French military. In the opening stages of the 1870 campaign just how serious a failing systeme D was became glaringly obvious. On the morning of 31 July the French 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps were moving forward to participate in the reconnaissance in force at Saarbrucken. The divisions were supposed be on the road by 0500, but Montaudon's First Division 3rd Corps, that was to take over the advance, received word that the divisions camped in front would not be ready to march until 0700 and that the arrival of Montaudon there before 0900 would cause “a regrettable tangle”. When the march did get under way it was painfully slow. Laveaucoupet's Third Division of 2nd Corps left its position at 1030 and took the better part of seven hours to march eight miles to its destination. Metman's Third Division, 3rd Corps, took six hours to travel a similar distance while de Lorencez's Third Division, 4th Corps, coming from another direction left camp at 1000 and only its vanguard arrived at its position six hours later, again after a march of just over eight miles. The whole of the next day was required to shuffle the divisions into their final positions. Some fourteen days later, at Rezonville, had the French columns been set in motion earlier they might have avoided the German interception.

However, the greatest damage done by the African experience seems to have been that the French cavalry had completely forgotten the art of reconnaissance. Instead of spreading out across the countryside in small patrols, observing as much as possible of the country before them, the French cavalry limited their reconnaissances to known routes and in squadron sized patrols that were easily observed and avoided by the Germans. This shortcoming was in part a result of the African experience and that vulnerability of small bodies and marked a failure to adapt back to the European environment, but was worsened by conflicting messages from Imperial Headquarters about how cavalry should be used. Before active operations began Louis Napoleon stated that reconnaissances did not need to be aggressive, implying that the cavalry should not stray far from their main bodies. Then four days later his chief of staff, Leboeuf, issued a contrary instruction: “Let your cavalry be seen. It must reconnoitre the whole of the Saar, and must not fear even to cross the frontier”. That confusion saw the cavalry either being withheld or, when they were committed to reconnaissance, they quickly broke contact instead of trying to force the issue. This lack of detailed reconnaissance resulted in Army intelligence having to work with rumour, speculation and reports of the foreign press that consequently formed a false picture of the German positions. The German cavalry, on the other hand, kept their reconnaissance parties small (in groups as small as three and on some occasions to a single rider). They spread out across the whole of the frontier reporting back all they saw and heard. Consequently the German commanders were much better informed of the French forward positions.

Examples of the French weakness in reconnaissance can be seen at Wissembourg on 4 August and at  Spicheren two days later. At the former a single French division was isolated at Wissembourg, separated from any serious support by a full day's march. When Douay, the divisional commander, heard rumours of a significant German force headed his way he ordered Colonel de Bonne with two squadrons of the 11th Chasseurs à Cheval to go forward in reconnaissance. De Bonne's attempt at reconnaissance can only be described as farcical. The cavalry rode through the streets of Altenstadt, a suburb of Wissembourg, then another two kilometres east along the line of the Lauter River. No attempt at all was made to press beyond the frontier towards Schleithal, the nearest German town, despite information from local residents that German troops were in the area in large numbers.  The reconnaissance was more like a leisurely morning ride than a serious attempt to identify any threat to the division. De Bonne returned to camp at 0730 reporting that no enemy was sighted.  Douay, convinced that there would be no action on this day, ordered the division to rest while 80,000 German troops were converging on the town. 

At Spicheren Frossard, commanding 2nd Corps, was deeply concerned about his exposed position. He had to hand sixteen squadrons of cavalry, more that sufficient to push pickets out for some distance along all crucial roads, yet Frossard pushed out only three reconnaissances, none of which was far ranging. The first was by a squadron of dragoons sent towards Saarbrucken where they sighted German cavalry, turned tail and returned to their own lines having made no effort to push the enemy and ascertain their true strength. The second was to the east where a squadron of the 5th Chasseurs à Cheval pressed to the top of the Simbach Ravine where they halted when they noted that no enemy was seen along the line of the Saar, some two and a half kilometres further to the east. The third was to the west, the direction from which Frossard expected a major German advance, and pushed only as far as the Frontier less than 3km from the front line. This reconnaissance returned late morning reporting evidence of enemy infantry operating in the area (although strangely no German infantry crossed the Saar until noon and none were that far west until late in the afternoon) but failed to note the presence of German cavalry even though the whole area was crawling with them. Thereafter Frossard's cavalry was formed enmasse in line of battle, waiting for an opportunity that never came.

And speaking of Frossard's cavalry, what follows here is the first of what will be four regiments that formed the cavalry division that was attached to his Corps. This was Marmier's Division, but Marmier was in transit from Algeria when active operations began and he was unable to join his command before the Army of the Rhine was bottled up in Metz. In his absence 61 year old general de brigade Paul de Valabrègue commanded the division. Born at London in 1809, the son of a former Napoleonic hussar turned diplomat,  he enlisted in the Foreign Legion in 1834, joined the spahis the following year, then the Chasseurs d'Afrique five years later. After ten years of African service he transferred back to France where he served in the 9th Dragoons, the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers and led the 6th Hussars in Italy. Made general de brigade in 1865 he took over Marmier's  Division that comprised of two brigades, Valabrègue's own brigade, the 4th and 5th Chasseur à Cheval regiments, and Bachieler's brigade, the 7th and 12th Dragoons. The regiment shown below in this post is the 4th Chasseur à Cheval. 

 general de brigade Paul de Valabrègue

For the 4th (and the 5th regiment that will follow in a couple of weeks), I have had to alter the headgear. The figures are supplied in the 1868 uniform with kepi, but only the 1st, 6th and 9th regiments had received the new uniform by 1870. So there was a need to create a talpac (a shallow lambs wool shako) for the 4th and 5th regiment, so out came the milliput and 11 talpacs were made - I chose to leave the senior officer in a kepi.

The Regiment, in their new talpacs, in the painting queue

This regiment also wears the green 1858 jacket and not the 1868 light blue one.

As nice as these figures are, the swords are way too thin and were badly bent in transit - to the extent that it was impossible to straighten them - and I know they will not withstand the rigours of the gaming table...I can see the need to cut then off and replace them within flattened steel wire.