Sunday, 8 February 2026

The Last Great Cavalry Battle on the Planet

Three and a half years ago, I wrote a post to celebrate the completion of a brigade of Prussian cavalry for 1870 and described the action known as von Bredow's "Death Ride" on the afternoon of 16 August 1870 (LINK).

After writing that post, I was keen to write about another cavalry action that took place a few hours later, just seven kilometers west of the scene of von Bredow's charge. There, on the hard-packed, dusty fields near the village of Ville-sur-Yron, 5,000 French and Prussian cavalrymen met in the last great cavalry battle on the planet. But I never seemed to find the time to put in to the necessary research. Now I have found that time.

Like von Bredow's charge, there is very little published on this action in English. The English version of the German Staff history covers the action in eight paragraphs in the blandest of terms, and David Ascoli's book on Mars-la-Tour gives it only nine paragraphs and is equally short of detail. Thankfully, there are two very good French studies and one in German, and snippets can be gleaned from several others in those languages. I was greatly helped by Google's Gemini AI tool with the translation of multiple pages, particularly of German text in Gothic print!

To make identifying French and German units a little easier, I have identified French units in italic type. German corps are identified in Roman numerals, the French in Arabic.

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Carrying on from my earlier description of the battle, while von Bredow's charge had gained temporary breathing space for Alvensleben's III Corps, the French—outnumbering the Prussians by nearly three to one—still threatened to overwhelm them. Relief for Alvensleben came when Bazaine’s obsession with his left flank saw him pull two divisions from Leboeuf's 3rd Corps out of the fight to reinforce that flank, ordering Leboeuf to hold his position with his remaining two divisions at all costs.

When Ladmirault's 4th Corps fell in on Leboeuf's right, the two generals decided to press forward against the exposed Prussian left. So, at 3:00 PM, two of Leboeuf's divisions, with one of Ladmirault's extending further to the right—perhaps 30,000 men in total—pressed forward with two more 4th Corps divisions to the rear. Facing them in the Tronville Copses were four battalions from Alvensleben's 6th Division, maybe 4,000 men, with von Barby's cavalry brigade to their left. The flank was easily turned and the Prussian battalions were driven back with heavy losses.

The occupation of Mars-la-Tour and the Tronville Copses was Ladmirault's for the taking. It looked as though Alvensleben's left would be driven back against its right like a closing book. However, when victory was within sight, Ladmirault faltered. Fearing the arrival of considerable Prussian reinforcements, he halted the advance and fell back on the high ground near Bruville.

True to form, Prussian reinforcements came up just in time. Marching to the sound of the guns, the leading elements of von Voigts-Rhetz's X Corps began to arrive on the field as Ladmirault retired. Woyna's 39th Brigade was immediately pressed forward. With his flank now exposed by the withdrawal of Ladmirault, Leboeuf was compelled to withdraw from the Tronville Copses. Voigts-Rhetz ordered Wedell's 38th Brigade forward on Woyna's left to take the French in the flank.

Wedell stormed forward a little after 5:00 PM, descending into a wooded ravine about a mile north of Mars-la-Tour. Unwittingly, he had blundered into the center of the French position; the ravine was swept by a storm of Chassepôt fire. The brigade went into action with 4,546 men and, in a short but brutal period, lost 2,614 officers and men before fleeing back in disorder with French infantry in pursuit.

The general situation after Wedell's repulse (base map taken from David Ascoli's A Day of Battle)

In desperation, Voigts-Rhetz turned to the brigade of Guard Dragoons that had accompanied him to the field. The brigade went forward boldly and caught the French completely by surprise. The Prussian cavalry rode down a regiment of French infantry, and after a brief combat, the French counter-attack faltered. The dragoons retired from the fray, leaving 220 of their comrades on the field. For the second time that day, Ladmirault pulled Cissey's Division back, but Grenier's Division continued to extend to the right.

It was now 6:00 PM and the threat to the Prussian left was every bit as serious as it had been two hours earlier. To bolster his left, Voigts-Rhetz turned yet again to the cavalry. Von Barby's 11th Cavalry Brigade was sent to secure the left and flank the French infantry beyond Mars-la-Tour.

Fifty year old Adalbert Roderich Levin von Barby was a career cavalry officer from a noble family. He had graduated from the Academy in Potsdam in 1831 and was posted to the prestigious Gardes du Corps Regiment. He remained with that regiment for the next 27 years, rising to the rank of captain in 1858. During the 1859 mobilisation he served on the staff and in 1862 transferred to the 1st Cuirassiers as lieutenant colonel then as colonel in 1866. He led the regiment in the Austro-Prussian War fighting at Battle of Königgrätz and Tobitschau. Late in that campaign, in a skirmish at Biskupice, his regiment charged and broke an Austrian square, for which he received the honour Pour le Merite. He was and given command of the 19th Cavalry Brigade in 1868 and then made major general commanding 11th Cavalry Brigade in 1870.

The 11th Brigade had been weakened by detachments and at the  time of its despatch to the left consisted of the 9th Dragoons, three squadrons of the 13th Uhlans, and two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers. To this force Voigts-Rhetz added the 13th and 16th Dragoons, three squadrons of the 10th (Magdeburg) Hussars, and two squadrons of the Guard Dragoons. In all, Barby moved with 22 squadrons.

Meanwhile, Ladmirault had been massing cavalry on his right. Elements of four cavalry divisions were operating in the area. First was Legrand's Division from Ladmirault's 4th Corps, consisting of two brigades: Montaigu's (2nd and 7th Hussars) and Gondrecourt's (3rd Dragoons—a second regiment, the 11th Dragoons, was detached and posted further east with the left wing of the corps). Second was the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique from Barail's First Reserve Division. Third were the 2nd and 4th Dragoons of Maubrance's Brigade and three squadrons of the 3rd and one of the 10th Chasseurs à Cheval from Brucard's Brigade, all from Clérambault's Division of the 3rd Corps. Finally, there were the Lancers of the Guard and the Empress’s Dragoons from de France's Brigade of the Guard Cavalry Division.

Both of the Barail and Legrand were officers of considerable experience, and both, like von Barby, had served in the cavalry their entire careers. Fredéric Legrand was the elder of the two and was 60 years old in 1870, born at Versailles in 1810. He came up through the ranks, having joined the hussars of the Royal Guard in 1828. He served in the Belgian campaign of 1831-32 and in 1837 was commissioned sous-lieutenant in the Spahis de Bone. Made captain in 1844 he served with the 2nd Spahis in 1845, the 4th Lancers later the same year and then the 3rd Spahis in 1847. Three years later he was chef d'escadron with the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique. In 1852 he was lieutenant colonel of the prestigious Guides of the Guard. He then transferred to the 11th Chasseurs a cheval ias colonel in 1855 and the 5th Cuirassiers a year later. Promoted to general de brigade in 1868 he commanded first at Lunéville before returning to Africa to command the Subdivision of Oran. His promotion to general de division came in 1868 and command of the cavalry division, 4th Corps in July 1870.

Ten years Legrand's junior, Francois Claude du Barail was also born at Versailles, in 1820. Like Legrand he came up from the ranks, enlisting at the age of nineteen in the Spahis of Oran. He served in many actions in North Africa and was commissioned lieutenant in 1844 and made captain four years later. Promotions to chef d'escadron in 1853 and a lieutenant colonel of the 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique in 1854. He transferred to the Guard in 1857 fo command the Chasseurs of the Guard, then to the first 1st Cuirassiers. In 1860 he returned to African service in command of the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique and when with parts of that unit went to Mexico he went with it and he was cited for his part in the actions of Choula and San Lorenzo, in 1863 he was made general de brigade and commanded the cavalry brigade in Mexico, before returning to France the following year to command the Light Cavalry Brigade of the Guard. In 1870 he was given command of the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division.

De France's Brigade had formed part of the escort for the Emperor as he made his way towards Verdun, but when the Emperor's column reached Conflans, the brigade had been deemed unnecessary and was detached. Also detached there was Lajaille's Second Brigade of Barail's Division. This brigade consisted of the 2nd and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique, but the 4th had been attached to Margueritte's First Brigade, which was providing Napoleon's escort.

All this left Barail as a divisional commander without a division. As the senior officer, he added the chasseurs to de France's Brigade and moved all three regiments to the right. There they took position, formed in close columns near the Jarny/Mars-la-Tour road, slightly behind the Gréyère Farm, and awaited orders.

Legrand had spent much of the afternoon covering the front of 4th Corps, but as more and more Prussian guns came into action, the cavalry was withdrawn behind Bruville. These regiments marched and counter-marched across the open fields for several hours, until around 6:30 PM they were joined by Clérambault's regiments.

Having rallied from their earlier action, the 1st and 2nd Guard Dragoons were moved to the left of Mars-la-Tour. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant von der Planitz's 1st Horse Battery (Guard Artillery Regiment), supported by the 4th Squadron, 2nd Guard Dragoons, was sent further to the left. They deployed on the high ground north of Mars-la-Tour, about 1,500 meters from the Gréyère Farm.

Planitz opened fire, and the 7th Hussars found themselves under an oblique fire. Legrand pulled his regiments back into some lower ground behind the farm to avoid the shells. Encouraged by the French withdrawal, Planitz moved his battery forward, which brought him into the line of fire of the 5th and 6th Batteries, 19th Horse Artillery Regiment, attached to Barail's Division.

The increase of activity on his right flank concerned Ladmirault, who came forward to the farm to observe the situation himself. He was concerned that a cloud of dust in that direction indicated a significant force. Believing that Planitz's deployment might be the precursor of a larger attack, he ordered a 12-pound battery to deploy near the Gréyère Farm to oppose it. He placed the 5th Chasseurs à pied in the ravine of the Fond de la Cuve, west of the farm, from where they could bring the battery under rifle fire. He also had the 98th Regiment drawn up behind the farm. He then instructed Barail to clear out the German battery.

Barail acted promptly, ordering the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique to attack. The regiment, broke into columns of platoons, crossed the narrow bridge that carried the farm track across the Fond de la Cuve at a gallop. They formed a column of squadrons without halting, facing southwest across the Mars-la-Tour road. Colonel Martinière rode to the front and called, "To the cannons!"

The view to the top of the rise where Planitz' battery stood, from the Gréyère Farm track. The Mars-la-Tour Road runs along the skyline  on the right

The regiment set off at the gallop en fourrageurs (open order) to minimize losses. Planitz's gunners were caught by surprise, and only a couple of rounds were fired. 

In response to the chasseurs' charge, the 4th Squadron, 2nd Guard Dragoons, charged to give the gunners a chance to get away. The gunners hurriedly limbered their guns and retreated towards Mars-la-Tour. French reports claim that the chasseurs rode through the battery and put most of Planitz's gunners to the sword, forcing the remainder to run for their lives and abandon their guns. Yet Planitz's report for 16 August shows only three men wounded, three horses killed and four wounded. These losses, the lieutenant wrote, were inflicted by French rifle fire. 

The first three squadrons of the chasseurs conducted a right wheel to face the Guard's charge, while de la Jaille held the 4th squadron back as a reserve. The chasseurs and Guard Dragoons soon became locked in an unequal fight. One squadron was unlikely to hold back three for long, but the Guards' charge had caused confusion in the French ranks, and during that moment of chaos, the Prussians brought forward fresh troopers.

Fortunately for the Prussians help was at hand. As the French cavalry began to mass across the Fond de la Cove Colonel Count von Finkenstein, of the 2nd Guard Dragoons, noted that his single squadron was insufficient to hold the position if charged and rode back with haste towards Mars-la-Tour to seek support. There he found the 13th (Oldenburg) Dragoons, which had arrived at Mars-la-Tour around 5:00 PM. Finkenstein requested support and the call was answered. Deploying rapidly, the 13th Dragoons plunged into the melee. The French forward squadrons gave way easily in the face of the fresh, formed enemy and fell back behind the 4th Squadron, which had been deployed as skirmishers and opened a fire with their carbines that caused the Prussian cavalry to halt. The other squadrons of the Chasseurs rallied and retired to the ravine.

The Charge of the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique

Following the Chasseurs' charge, there was a brief lull on this part of the field as both sides began to build up cavalry strength. Scouts had reported to Ladmirault that there was a “large mass of cavalry coming from Mars-la-Tour...” This was undoubtedly von Barby's Brigade, which had advanced northwest of the town. However, from his position between Bruville and the Gréyère Farm, Ladmirault would not have been observe this force personally and without confirming the reports, responded by sending an ADC, Captain de la Tour du Pin, to Barail, Legrand, and De France with instructions to: "Gather all the cavalry; have them charge en masse, in order to clear the right of the threatened line.”

As soon as he received the order, Legrand ordered his three regiments forward. Montaigu's hussars led the way, forming a column of platoons and crossing the Fond de la Cuve at a dry spot just downstream from the Gréyère Farm. Once across the stream, they deployed facing the direction where the Chasseurs could still be seen skirmishing with the Prussian cavalry a while earlier: the 7th Hussars on the left and the 2nd to their right. The 3rd Dragoons were slower crossing the stream but would fall in behind Montaigu.

De France's Guard Cavalry Brigade also came across the stream. It had set off a little after Montaigu, crossing in a column of fours at a small bridge west of Bruville. The Lancers of the Guard led the way, forming a column of platoons upon crossing the stream and then wheeling left into line to the right-rear of the hussars, with their right flank brushing the grounds of the La Grange Farm. The Empress Dragoons, following the lancers, were slow to cross the bridge and moved still further to the right and rear of the lancers, behind the farm. The whole formation, when completed, would be an echelon about 1,000 meters long.

While the French were deploying Colonel von Brauchitsch of the 13th Dragoons had observed the build up and approach of the French cavalry. He sounded the assembly, disengaged from the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique and reformed on the high ground.

Von Barby at this time was advancing from Mars-la-Tour. He had drawn his command up in two lines a few hundred meters north and west of the town. He too observed the French deploy, he sent the three squadrons of the 10th Hussars forward to support von Brauchitsch. His own brigade was to the left-rear of the forward units, but made slow progress due to the hedges and ditches around the town. The regiments moved in a column of squadrons with the 19th Dragoons on the right, the 4th Cuirassiers in the center, and the 13th Uhlans on the left. The 16th Dragoons were held back behind the Uhlans.

The terrain where the cavalry masses were forming, north of Mars-la-Tour and east of Ville-sur-Yron, was (and still is today) a broad open plain that lies between the Yron and Fond de la Cuve streams. A slight ridge runs north from Mars-la-Tour, along which the road to Jarny runs as far as the junction to Ville-sur-Yron. The ground then descends gently to the northeast for the next 1,000 meters to the junction of the Gréyère Farm track. The whole area was open fields, free of fences, walls, or hedges as far as the La Grand Farm. In the summer heat of August 1870, the ground was hard-packed and dusty.

Looking North from the Ville-sur-Yron Road across the crest of the plain. In the centre is the modern day monument to the cavalry battle

A clearer view of the monument

The view West across the plain from the Jarny Road

While Montaigu was deploying, he was approached by Barail, who was impatient with the deployment and suggested to Montaigu that now was the time to go to the rescue of the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique. Montaigu, however, would not be drawn and replied that he would await the orders of Legrand, although he did go forward on a personal reconnaissance. There he observed that the Prussians were advancing slowly. Fearing that he would be charged, he sent word to the Chasseurs d'Afrique to clear the area. He then headed back to his brigade, intent on taking the initiative and charging the Prussians. He arrived back at his command just as Legrand arrived at the head of the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons.

Legrand noted that the Prussians were now further to the right and placed the two squadrons of dragoons behind the hussars, facing the Prussian dragoons. The remaining squadrons of the dragoons had been delayed in crossing the stream and were well behind. When Montaigu reported his intentions to attack to Legrand, Barail—who was also present—protested that twenty minutes earlier “...I advised General de Mointaigu to charge, to take advantage of the disorder that my Chasseurs d'Afrique had thrown among the Germans. More German cavalry have arrived,” he went on, “and are well-positioned now. It is too late; the moment has passed!”

Legrand was not to be deterred and said to Barail, “It is all the same to me. I have been ordered to charge; I charge.”

Nonetheless Legrand seemed reluctant to make the attack. Colonel Carrelet of the 2nd Hussars requested permission to open fire with the Chassepot carbines upon the mass of German cavalry in the hope that the fire might shake the enemy. However, the distance was extreme—between 700 and 800 meters—and any fire was unlikely to have and serious impact.

Around this time, Lieutenant Niel, another of Ladmirault's ADCs, arrived with orders from the impatient general to attack without delay.

Legrand's mind was made up. He replied to Carrelet, "No, no! With the saber!".

Carrelet repeated his request: "Let us fire a volley before charging, General."

Montaigu stepped into the conversation: "No, the order is formal," and, drawing his sword, he cried out, "With cold steel! Forward, gentlemen!"

With that, the brigade set off at the gallop, still partly in column at half-distances. From the start, the pace was too great. The enemy was between 600–800 metres distant and upslope. 

Atop the rise, Colonel von Brauchitsch held his nerve, and the Prussian 13th Dragoons stood stationary with the 4th Squadron, 2nd Guard Dragoons to their left, awaiting the onslaught. When the French were still 500 metres away, he saw that they threatened to turn his right. Brauchitsch ordered a wheel by platoons to the right at the trot, then ordered a wheel back in, then charged. It was a risky movement in the face of a charging enemy, but he had confidence in his troopers.

As the two lines came within 200 metres of each other, a cry went up in the 7th Hussars: “It is the Guard!” The pace of the hussars slowed momentarily before resuming at the gallop. Meanwhile, the left most squadron of the 13th Dragoons and the 4th Squadron, 2nd Guard Dragoons, had taken measures to face the 2nd Hussars, who extended beyond their left and threatened to flank the German line. This opened a gap in the line that portions of the 7th Hussars passed through, attempting to turn back on the Prussians. A vicious melee erupted in the open fields.

The 2nd Hussars met the Guard Dragoons head-on with Montaigu in the lead. The length of the charge and the maneuvers of the day were taking their toll; the horses were struggling. The attack began to falter, and Montaigu fell wounded and was captured. At that moment, Colonel von Weise brought the 10th Hussars forward on the left of the 13th Dragoons in platoon columns. Finding the ground in front of them clear, the 3rd and then the 4th Squadrons deployed on the march and wheeled into the 2nd Hussars. At the same time, the 2nd Squadron moved to the right of the dragoon line. One platoon extended further left and threatened to flank the French line, while the remaining three platoons struck those French hussars that had succeeded in pushing through the dragoons, plugging the gap. After a brief melee, the French hussars, checked in front and now flanked by the 10th Hussars, gave way and fled back to the ravine, followed hotly by the 10th Hussars. But when they neared the ravine, the 2nd Chasseurs d’Afrique, who had rallied there after their earlier charge, received them with heavy carbine fire.

As the hussars gave way, the first of von Barby’s Brigade came into view. As a result of the delays in the field around Mars-la-Tour, the 19th Dragoons were ahead of the rest of the brigade, heading for de France's Brigade. As the Dragoons crossed the Ville-sur-Yron road they descended into a shallow depression from which they could not see over the crest. When they reached the crest they found themselves further right than expected and were close to the 3rd and 4th Squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons, Immediately Legrand ordered the charge with himself and the regiment's Colonel Bilhau in the lead. The 19th Dragoons were still moving at the trot and the 1st Squadron, on the right of the line, was forced to wheel right to face the French dragoons. The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons, which arrived just as the charge commenced, extended the charging line to the right.

The 3rd Dragons and the right hand squadron of the 19th Dragoons became mixed in the fight with Montaigu’s troopers. The remaining three squadrons of the 19th Dragoons quickened their pace from trot to gallop to charge. The horses of the French dragoons, like those of the hussars, were “a bit breathless,” but they smashed into the Prussians, the 1st and 2nd Squadrons striking the flank of the Prussian dragoons. The two lines intermingled in a furious melee of sabres and pistols that would last half an hour. Legrand had his horse killed, and in the fall, his sword broke. Dismounted and disarmed, he was struck and killed by a bullet. General du Gondrecourt, who commanded the Dragoon Brigade, found himself isolated and surrounded by several Prussian dragoons, but he spurred his way through to join his own men. Colonel Bilhau was unhorsed and captured, as was Lieutenant-Colonel Collignon.

The great charge of Legrand and de France

The three remaining squadrons of the 19th Dragoons continued toward the Lancers of the Guard. The lancers had only just formed, and de France was uncertain whether the approaching troopers were friend or foe. When the Prussians came within 100 metres, Colonel Latheulade called out, “It’s them!” He raised his sword and yelled, “Charge!”

The lancers hardly got up to speed before they collided with the 19th Dragoons. This collision occurred just as the 3rd and 4th Squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons passed through the Prussian unit. That day, the Lancers of the Guard wore the undress light-blue jacket; as they passed through the Prussian line, the troopers of the 3rd Dragoons mistook them for Prussian Dragoons—who also wore light blue—and struck at them with sabres. When the Lancers cried out, “We are French!”, the dragoons replied, “No quarter!” Several lancers were lost to 'friendly fire'.

At that moment, von Barby brought up the rest of the brigade, personally riding with the 13th Uhlans. Part of the 1st Squadron came up on the right of the 19th Dragoons and slammed into the 3rd Dragoons, while the rest of the squadron struck the 2nd Squadron, Lancers of the Guard, on the right. This squadron had not completed its deployment when the Uhlans struck and was only just beginning to move. The Empress Dragoons, who were still deploying to the Lancers’ rear, were charged by the 2nd Squadron of the 13th Uhlans. Two squadrons of the dragoons resisted strongly, firing their carbines from the saddle. The 4th Squadron of the Uhlans then came forward in platoon columns, executed a half-wheel to the right, and struck a third squadron of the Empress Dragoons. Finally, the 5th Squadron of the 2nd Guard Dragoons swung wide past the Uhlans' left, formed a platoon column to pass around the La Grange Farm, crossed a hedge, formed into a squadron line and struck the last squadron of the Empress Dragoons.

The 4th Cuirassiers then entered the attack, charging the Lancers of the Guard. The 1st Squadron on the left charged first, with the 3rd Squadron moving en echelon on the right. Both squadrons joined the portion of the Uhlans striking the right of the Lancers of the Guard. The 16th Dragoons in column of platoons, pushed past the 19th dragoons and struck the lancers' left, driving them back on themselves.

The whole of the Yron plateau was a swirling mass of cavalry combat that threw up a huge dust cloud. The German cavalry was gaining the upper hand. At some point among the troopers of de France’s Brigade the rally was sounded—perhaps to prevent further friendly fire—and the Empress Dragoons and the Lancers of the Guard began to disengage. Slowly, the fighting mass edged northeast until the French cavalry was withdrawn across the Fond de la Cuve. Clérambault’s Division came forward and deployed behind the stream in front of the Gréyère Farm. The 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique, that had fallen back after Montaigu's repulse, formed north of the battlefield, near the Jarny Road. The sight of these fresh troops, combined with the confused nature of the German attack, caused von Barby to sound the rally. 

Twenty-two Prussian and twenty-one French squadrons, between 5,000 and 6,000 horsemen, had been engaged. The fight had lasted perhaps forty-five minutes, but for all its drama and the decisive repulse of the French attack, it had no effect of on the outcome of the battle. Fresh German infantry arrived between the end of the melee and nightfall. At the end of the day Bazaine had the Army of the Rhine fall back on Metz.

Casualties were high for cavalry:

French Casualties

  • Staff: 8 officers (including Legrand, Montaigu, Bilhau, and Collignon).
  • 2nd Hussars: 19 officers, 64 men.
  • 7th Hussars: 10 officers, 50 men.
  • 3rd Dragoons: 12 officers, 59 men.
  • Lancers of the Guard: 16 officers, 125 men.
  • Empress Dragoons: 10 officers, 58 men.
  • 2nd Chasseurs d’Afrique: 5 officers, 51 men.
  • Total: 80 officers and 407 men. (Horse losses not reported).

German Casualties

  • Von Barby’s Brigade Staff: 2 officers wounded.
  • 19th Dragoons: 12 officers, 113 men.
  • 13th Uhlans: 6 officers, 51 men.
  • 4th Cuirassiers: 3 officers, 42 men.
  • 13th Dragoons: 8 officers, 90 men.
  • 10th Hussars: 4 officers, 31 men.
  • 16th Dragoons: 2 officers, 13 men.
  • 2nd Guard Dragoons: 4 officers, 103 men.
  • Total: 42 officers, 443 men, and 394 horses.

The last great cavalry battle on the planet came to a close. While both sides had fumbled their way into action, the French cavalry were the architects of their own defeat. They lacked a unity of command that meant the various brigades and regiments had entered the fight under three generals - Barail, Legrand and de France, none of whom was in overall command. They cooperated, but did not coordinate and that lack of coordination led to a sloppy deployment that saw them attack en echelon.  As formidable as this formation appeared, it suffered from a lack of lateral flexibility. Once the charge began, the momentum of the following echelons made it difficult to redirect if the enemy performed an unexpected manoeuvre, as the 10th Hussars and 13th Uhlans had done. Perhaps their greatest mistake was to charge at all. Barail was quite correct stating that the time to charge had passed. Letting the Germans come on and then counter charging was most likely the better option. The desire to take the initiative with horses already tired on very hot day, meant that a charge of 700-800 meters up-slope at the gallop, utterly exhausted the horses and gave the Germans the upper hand in the combat.

Principal Sources:

  • Ascoli, David, A Day of Battle, London 1987
  • Bonie, Jean Jacques Theophile, The French Cavalry in 1870: With Its Tactical Results, Paris 1874
  • De Lonlay, Dick (G.Hardouin), Français & Allemands: Histoire Anecdotique de la Guerre de 1870-1871, Vol 3, Paris 1887
  • France Armée, Etat Major, Section Historique,  La Guerre de 1870/71, Vol 12, Parts 1 and 2, Paris 1903-1913. 
  • Great German Staff: The Franco-German War 1870-1871, Vol 2, Nashville 1995
  • Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince Kraft Zu, Letters on Cavalry, London, 1898
  • Hozier, Henry M., The Franco-Prussian War: Its causes, Incidents, and Consequences, Vol 1, London, 1872
  • Kaehler, Otto August Johann, Die Reiterei in der Schlacht bei Vionville und Mars la Tour am 16. August 1870, Berlin 1874
  • Lehautcourt, Pierre, La Cavalerie dans la Bataille (15 et 16 août 1870), Paris 1906
  • Wood, General Sir Evelyn, Achievements of Cavalry, London 1897









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